In France, economic philosophy has a long tradition – and a brilliant one, as hosting the Third International of Economic Philosophy (June 2016, Aix-en-Provence) illustrated. The publication of an “inventory” of research in France in that field is meant to serve as a reference. The volume issued in March 2017 aims at providing a panoramic view to help the reader find one’s bearings in a multifaceted production. The kind of critique economic philosophy may foster should be regarded as a matter of adequately sorting out ways of reasoning on matters of ontology, methodology, the role of neighboring social sciences, the use of norms, notions like rational vs. reasonable, probable vs. plausible, fundamental notions that influence presently blossoming fields like simulation in social sciences, institutional analysis, ecological and developmental economics, the philosophy of finance, and so on, In France, the tradition that Alain Leroux and Pierre Livet - notably among others - established from Aix-en-Provence to Paris, has produced works covered (one may want to say “mapped” in the present volume).

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Gilles Campagnolo (Research director, CNRS) and Jean-Sébastien Gharbi (Ass. Prof., Reims University) coordinated the work and wrote the Introduction that displays economic philosophy as the reflexive attitude they promote in science.

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Tomasz Kwarciański (Cracow University of Economics) and Paweł Ulman (Cracow University of Economics). Hybrid Version of Well-Being. An Attempt of Operationalisation

There are two main problems of well-being theory that the approaches to well-being such as hedonism, preference fulfillment theory, and the objective list theories have to deal with. The first one concerns maintaining agent’s autonomy and the second breaking the vicious circle of personal adaptation to living in poor conditions. While hedonism and preference fulfillment theory are able to effectively tackle the autonomy problem, they cannot overcome the problem of personal adaptation. In contrast, the objective list theories can solve the adaptation problem but encounter difficulties as far as the agent’s autonomy is concerned.

The aim of this paper is to investigate the possibility of constructing a hybrid version of well-being, and (making an attempt of) its operationalisation. We believe this could be a step forward into adequately solving problems of autonomy and adaptation. Our research will be based on empirical analysis of datasets from European Quality of Life Survey Integrated Data File, 2003-2012. The depositor of the data is The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions. The data were downloaded from UK Data Service.
The aim of our paper is to introduce a distinction between epistemic and institutional concepts of discipline. By doing this we want to achieve two aims. First, we want to show how epistemically relevant questions, that interdisciplinary exchanges provoke, should be approached and analysed. Second, we want to use our philosophical analysis of interdisciplinarity in order to inform the discussion of economics imperialism.

We believe, similarly to Uskali Mäki (Mäki forthcoming, European Journal for Philosophy of Science) and Hanne Andersen (Andersen 2016), that the increasingly interdisciplinary character of work done within contemporary science challenges the traditional philosophical accounts of science and its structure. There is a role that philosophy can play in the analysis of the epistemic problems that the so-called interdisciplinary exchanges and practices provoke, as well as in the analysis of the epistemic advances it promises.

Our paper aims at introducing a distinction between an epistemic and institutional concept of a discipline in order to highlight the presumption that hinders, in our opinion, the proper analysis of the epistemic aspects of interdisciplinarity. There are two ways to approach disciplines: disciplines as social institutions and disciplines as epistemic projects these institutions have. What makes interdisciplinarity interesting from a philosophical point of view, is not so much the issues related to institutional organization, but the promise of the interchange between the epistemic projects. This promise consists of an attempt of providing a more complex, adequate, accurate scientific image of a phenomenon (e.g. market) through transcending existing disciplinary boundaries. So understood the epistemic promise, as we call it, presumes that disciplines that exist as institutional entities are also coincidentally instantiating the relevant epistemic units for philosophical analysis of this epistemic dimension – that is, we can abstract epistemic disciplines to be the units of analysis (we call this the instantiation presumption). But we will show that the epistemic discipline is a fiction.

This doesn’t mean, however, that the epistemic issues discussed in the context of interdisciplinarity are not real. On the contrary, we sympathize with the efforts to deal with them through philosophy of science. We also think that these epistemic issues are a game-changer for some old-fashioned philosophical debates such as scientific realism and the progress of science. But we would like to show that the interacting elements that are relevant for these epistemic issues come from smaller units from within the respective disciplines. We will discuss the topic both in abstract and through two examples.

We suggest, on the basis of the examples taken from economics and biology that the relevant epistemic units that should be subject of a philosophical analysis of interdisciplinarity are smaller than a discipline (epistemic discipline). The interdisciplinary exchanges take place typically between sub-fields or schools of different institutional disciplines, or research programmes, but not between whole disciplines. This also means that a discipline doesn’t provide one, unified image of phenomena, but that we can indicate different images of phenomena within a discipline given by smaller epistemic units developed within an institutional discipline.

At the same time, the epistemic unit cannot obviously be a single theory, but it has to include a variety of epistemically relevant elements, such as theories, models, methods, practices, and various philosophical assumptions. Only these together can make up an epistemic unit. In other words, the relevant epistemic unit is a particular integrated set of various cognitive tools shared by a research community smaller than a discipline. The similarity between what we try to outline and the way Imre Lakatos is characterizing research programmes (Lakatos 1978), although for very different purposes, is close enough that we suggest tentatively that these units are research programmes. We will next argue that the attempts to establish a new interdisciplinary research are actually attempts to initiate/develop a new research programme.

Interdisciplinarity has challenged the image of science and its epistemic division of labour by challenging the borders of disciplines. This is both a challenge for philosophy of science and an epistemic promise of an even more unified scientific image (e.g. the interdisciplinary view of the markets would not only combine economic and sociological facts, but have a synthetic new image of markets). Fulfilling the epistemic promise is what is at stake in the calls for more interdisciplinary work. We attempt to list types and examples of philosophical and epistemic problems that the interdisciplinarity brings to philosophical investigations.

Finally, we show how our philosophical analysis of the epistemic dimension of interdisciplinary exchanges, can help us to shed new light on the discussion on economics imperialism. Economics imperialism is a form of so-called scientific imperialism. The debate on scientific imperialism in philosophy of science has revolved around the question of the permissibility of the application of scientific theories and methods outside the discipline in which they were initially introduced. Philosophers of science have attempted to clarify what it means for a discipline to be applied outside its own field or domain and whether such an application can be understood as imperialistic (Dupré 1995; Mäki 2013; Clarke and Walsh 2009). We argue that thinking about the economics imperialism in terms of a relationship between (epistemic) disciplines is misleading. Only, when we realize that in fact economics imperialism is to be characterized as a relationship between smaller epistemic units, we can point out to important epistemic dimension of it. This then helps us to make sense of the claims made by the opponents of economics imperialism – that it is a scientific practice that leads to epistemic loss (see: Dupré 1995; Clarke
and Walsh 2009).
Copernicus-Gresham’s Law, formulated in the pre-classical era of political economy, states that worse money drives better money out of circulation. Recently, this law has been investigated mainly by sociologists of science and historians of economic thought, economic historians and theoretical economists. However, what is still missing is an epistemological and methodological reflection on this law. The present article aims at filling this gap and is organized as follows: in the first section the division of scientific research on Copernicus-Gresham’s Law is indicated. The second part is a review of its selected classical expressions, of methodological objections raised against this law, and risks related to every attempt of its revision or refinement. The third section contains the reconstruction of antecedent of this law, that is, conditions under which it operates. The fourth part analyzes the consequent of the law in question, that is, the problem of explanatory power of driving out’s dependency. In the fifth section we explore the methodological status of the law of worse money and after considering the causal approach to it, we propose a functional one. The sixth part discusses the model of the market for “lemons” (bad quality commodities), which is an example of heuristic utilization of the Copernicus-Gresham’s Law. Finally, in the last section we indicate some possibilities of generalization of the law in question.